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ABSTRACT
Computer network defense is a partnership between automated
systems and human cyber security analysts. The system behaviors,
for example raising a high proportion of false alarms, likely impact
cyber analyst performance. Experimentation in the analyst-system
domain is challenging due to lack of access to security experts, the
usability of attack datasets, and the training required to use secu-
rity analysis tools. This paper describes Cry Wolf, an open source
web application for user studies of cyber security analysis tasks.
This paper also provides an open-access dataset of 73 true and false
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alarms derived from real-world
examples of impossible travel scenarios. Cry Wolf and the impossi-
ble travel dataset were used in an experiment on the impact of IDS
false alarm rate on analysts’ abilities to correctly classify IDS alerts
as true or false alarms. Results from that experiment are used to
evaluate the quality of the dataset using difficulty and discrimina-
tion index measures drawn from classical test theory. Many alerts
in the dataset provide good discrimination for participants’ overall
task performance.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Usability in security and privacy;
Intrusion detection systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Computer network defense is a partnership between humans and
machines. Machines are necessary to process voluminous network
data, and humans must investigate suspicious behaviors identified
on the network. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSes) inspect net-
work activity for known attack signatures, violations of user-configured
rules, and statistical anomalies [6]. IDSes then alert human cyber
ACMSE 2020, April 2–4, 2020, Tampa, FL, USA
© 2020 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here for your personal
use. Not for redistribution. The definitive Version of Record was published in
2020 ACM Southeast Conference (ACMSE 2020), April 2–4, 2020, Tampa, FL, USA,
https://doi.org/10.1145/3374135.3385301.
analysts of suspicious activity. However, IDS systems often pro-
duce false alarm rates above 95%, requiring cyber analysts to eval-
uate hundreds or thousands of false alarms [10]. This behavior
may lead to a vulnerabilities at the analyst-system interface; re-
search shows that low true event probability and high false alarm
rate reduce human operator performance [2, 3]. While researchers
strive to improve the accuracy of IDSes, comparatively little re-
search has been published on how the behaviors of IDSes and other
semi-automated cyber security systems impact the performance of
human cyber analysts.
Experimentation on cyber security analyst performance is chal-
lenging. Cyber security professionals are difficult to access due
to the sensitivity of their work. Further, security-focused datasets
that may be used to simulate real attacks in an experimental envi-
ronment (e.g., [4]) are often raw network captures and system logs
rather than cyber defense tool output, and training study partici-
pants on real IDS and network monitoring systems is intractable.
Consequently, few quantitative experiments have been published
on analyst performance in cyber security tasks (e.g., [1, 7]).
This paper presents two open-access resources that help address
the need for controlled experimentation of cyber analyst perfor-
mance. Section 2 describes an IDS alarm dataset derived from real
true and false alarms from the University of North Carolina, Wilm-
ington (UNCW)’s IDSes. Section 3 introduces the open source Cry
Wolfweb applicationwherein users evaluate alarms from the dataset,
answer a questionnaire on user expertise, and reflect on the task.
Finally, Section 4 presents an initial evaluation of the dataset’s qual-
ity using results from a controlled experiment conducted using the
Cry Wolf platform.
2 THE IMPOSSIBLE TRAVEL DATASET
The first resource is a dataset of simulated IDS alerts derived from
real impossible travel alarms. Impossible travel alerts are triggered
when a user authenticates from two geographic locations within
a period where physical travel between the two locations is im-
possible, e.g., authentications from London and Moscow with a
time between authentications of 30 minutes. Physical travel in this
time frame is impossible, but the authentications may be legitimate
through technical means such as a Virtual Private Network (VPN).
The dataset contains true alarms where the impossible travel
alert warrants further investigation for potential malicious activ-
ity, and false alarms where the alert is not cause for concern. The
dataset contains 73 alerts in all: 30 true alarms and 43 false alarms
and is available at https://uncw-hfcs.github.io/ids-simulator-analysis/.
These particular numbers of alerts were needed for the experiment
introduced in Section 4 and fully reported in [13]. Each alert con-
tains the following data:
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• Cities of Authentication— The two geographic locations
from which the IDS detected an authentication.
• Number of Successful Logins — The number of success-
ful authentications from each location in the past 24 hours.
• Number of Failed Logins — The number of failed logins
from each location in the past 24 hours.
• Source Provider—The type of internet provider the autho-
rizations came from at each location. Possible values are:
– Telecom — traditional Internet Service Providers
– Mobile/cellular — wireless carriers
– Hosting/server — hosted service providers, e.g., VPNs,
web hosts, and cloud computing
• Time between Authentications — The shortest time be-
tween authentications from the two cities in the past 24
hours. Reported in decimal hours. This the field that trig-
gers an alarm in a real IDS.
• VPN Confidence — A percent likelihood that the user uti-
lized a VPN.
Examples are provided in §2.2. These data fields were chosen
based on the first author’s experience as a security operations an-
alyst at UNCW. These fields were most often considered when de-
ciding whether an impossible travel alert was normal from the uni-
versity IDSes. The data values for events were based on real sam-
ples from UNCW’s IDSes with random noise added. Location pairs
were generated from combinations of 12 notable cities.
2.1 Evaluating Alerts – the Security Playbook
A "Security Playbook" accompanies the dataset and guides how
to use the data fields to evaluate whether an alert is a true alarm
or false alarm. The guidance reflects how an expert familiar with
IDS behavior and the network being protected would evaluate the
alerts. The playbookmay be viewed at https://git.io/JvE0I. This sec-
tion summarizes the main elements of the playbook as articulated
to the reader.
One of the cities in each alert corresponds to legitimate access.
Every city has a concern level based on a history of attacks: Moscow
and Beijing are "High" concern cities, North American cities are
"Low" concern, and all others are "Medium" concern. However,
users travel legitimately and hosted services may connect from
other countries, thus location should not be the sole deciding fac-
tor.
Time between authentications is the field that triggered the alert.
Authentications from different locations in a short time could be an
indication of account compromise. The Security Playbook provides
a table of typical travel times between all pairs of locations. The
ratio of successful logins to failed logins from each location may
also indicate malicious activity. More failed logins than successful
logins could be an indication of password guessing, but legitimate
users may fail to authenticate as well, e.g., by using an expired
password.
The source providers help interpret the other information. A tele-
com provider implies the login is originating from a user physi-
cally at the location, whereas a mobile/cellular or hosting/server
provider does not necessarily mean the user is physically present.
There is nothing inherently safe or malicious about any type of
source provider. The VPN confidence percentage is the likelihood
that the authentication attempts were made via a VPN.
The Security Playbook contains a "Things to Keep in Mind" sec-
tion with additional considerations. This section reminds evalua-
tors that IDSes can be inaccurate and that a few, many, or all of the
alerts may be false alarms. Another consideration is that users vis-
iting countries with restrictive governments will often use a VPN
to circumvent that nation’s firewall. Finally, the section states that
it is not unusual for a mobile device to ping the country in which
the mobile device is registered when the user is traveling abroad.
2.2 Scenarios
The impossible travel dataset covers seven scenarios encountered
in real alerts from UNCW’s IDSes.
2.2.1 True Impossible Travel. The dataset contains 19 impossible
travel alerts that are true alarms. An example is shown in Table 1.
In these alerts, the time between authentications is less than the
time required for a person to travel between the locations as pro-
vided in the Security Playbook, and the source providers are set to
telecom to indicate that the persons attempting the authentications
are in those physical locations.
Table 1: Event #66 — A True Alarm with Password Guessing
City of Authentication Seattle Moscow
# Successful Logins 4 11
# Failed Logins 1 3
Source Provider Telecom Telecom
Time between Authentications 1.75
VPN Confidence 0%
2.2.2 Password Guessing. The dataset contains six true alarmswhere
the number of failed logins from one or both cities exceeds the
number of successful logins from that city. In contrast, the ratio of
failed-to-successful logins is less than 1.0 in the rest of the dataset.
2.2.3 EdgeCase Travel. The dataset contains 15 false alarmswhere
the time between authentications is within 20 minutes of the typi-
cal time between the two cities. The Security Playbook emphasizes
the travel time table shows "typical times" and not minima or max-
ima. All of the cities are "low concern" and the source providers
are either "telecom" or "mobile/cellular" to encourage focus on the
times.
2.2.4 Eurotrip. The dataset contains six false alarmswith the same
features as the "edge case travel" scenarios except that both cities
are in Europe. All European cities are of "medium concern", which
may lead some evaluators to escalate these scenarios.
2.2.5 Mobile. The dataset contains eight false alarms of authenti-
cation from a mobile device. Table 2 shows an example. A mobile
device may initially route through its home country when travel-
ing abroad as mentioned in the Security Playbook. For all the mo-
bile scenario alerts, the source provider is "mobile/cellular" from a
city in the USA, and the other city’s source provider is "telecom".
The idea is the user authenticates from a computer abroad while
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their mobile device is occasionally pinging their home wireless ser-
vice.
Table 2: Event #18 — A False Alarm from Mobile Usage
City of Authentication Miami London
# Successful Logins 3 12
# Failed Logins 2 0
Source Provider Mobile/Cellular Telecom
Time between Authentications 0.90
VPN Confidence 0%
2.2.6 VPN. The dataset contains seven false alarms stemming from
users employing VPN services in a location separate from the user’s
physical location. The VPN confidence for these alerts is >90%. One
of the cities is "high concern" and has a telecom source provider
to indicate the user is physically present The other city is low or
medium concern and has a hosting/service source provider that is
intended to be the VPN service.
2.2.7 Hosting/servers. The dataset contains 12 false alarms that
entail using a server or hosting service. These alerts involve only
low or medium concern cities, and one of the source providers is
"hosting/server" while the other is "telecom" to indicate the user
is geographical situated in one place. The VPN confidence values
are between 53-71% to distinguish these alarms from the higher
confidence VPN scenario with high and medium concern cities.
3 THE CRYWOLF PLATFORM
The Cry Wolf web application provides a simulated environment
for evaluating IDS alarms from the impossible travel dataset. Cry
Wolf is written in the Flask micro-framework for Python. Source
code and screenshots of CryWolf are available at https://uncw-hfcs.github.io/ids-simulator/
The webapp implements an experiment to evaluate the impact of
IDS false alarm rate (FAR) on analyst performance in correctly clas-
sifying alerts as true or false alarms. The webapp provides the fol-
lowing experimentation structure:
(1) A login page with experiment description and Institutional
Review Board information. User logins are assigned by a
human proctor, and participants is placed into a 50% or 86%
FAR treatment group based on the login name.
(2) A questionnaire that captures participant expertise in cyber
security and networking for use in performance analysis.
(3) A training page introducing the experiment’s scenario, the
Security Playbook, and five training alerts with rationale.
(4) The main alert evaluation task, which displays a table of
alerts and links to the alert details. The details are presented
similarly to the examples shown in Tables 1–2.
(5) A post-survey that administers the NASA Task Load Index
questionnaire [9] and self-reflection questions on the IDS
alert evaluation for use in analysis.
In part (4), the participant reviews the alert data against the Se-
curity Playbook and chooses to "escalate" or "don’t escalate" the
alert, which classifies the alert as a true or false alarm respectively.
An analysis script compares participants’ answers against an ora-
cle of whether the alerts were true or false alarms, and generates
a confusion matrix to derive classification performance measures
of sensitivity, specificity, and precision. The repository of analysis
scripts is https://github.com/uncw-hfcs/ids-simulator-analysis.
The Cry Wolf platform has several benefits for user experimen-
tation. Nearly all of the experimental procedure is automated in the
application; the only intervention required by the experimenter is
to obtain informed consent and assign a pre-generated login code.
The platform captures precise data on when the participants view
and classify each alert, enabling fine-grained analysis of time-on-
task. Subjects can exit and resume the experiment as necessary
using their assigned logins, and the web application can be de-
ployed on a cloud server for maximum availability. Cry Wolf is
open source, and experimenters knowledgeable of Python and web
development can adapt it to variations of the experimental struc-
ture. Further details the Cry Wolf platform structure and imple-
mentation are provided in [13].
4 EVALUATION OF THE IMPOSSIBLE TRAVEL
DATASET
This section presents an initial evaluation of the quality of the im-
possible travel dataset for use in controlled experimentation of cy-
ber analyst performance. In Fall 2019, 51 individuals participated
in an experiment using the Cry Wolf platform. The goal of that ex-
periment was to evaluate the impact of IDS false alarm rate on an-
alysts’ abilities to correctly classify IDS alerts as true or false alarms.
The participants were randomly assigned to one of two treatment
groups: 25 participants were treated with a 50% false alarm rate
(25 true and 25 false alarms), and 26 participants were treated with
an 86% false alarm rate (seven true and 43 false alarms). Partici-
pants were shown alerts from the dataset and classified each as a
true or false alarm. The experiment was not time-limited, and the
median time to complete the classification of all 50 alerts was 15.6
minutes. The experiment, its initial findings, and threats to validity
are fully reported in [13]. The remainder of this section examines
the quality of the impossible travel dataset using data from that
experiment.
4.1 Measures of Dataset Quality
Classical test theory provides twomeasures to evaluate the quality
of individual alerts: the alert’s difficulty index and discrimination
index [5]. These measures are traditionally used to evaluate the
quality questions in psychometric and educational tests.
An alert’s difficulty index,p is the proportion of participants who
correctly classified an alert as a true or false alarm to the total num-
ber of people who classified the alert. Lord suggests a target of
p ≈ 0.85 for items with a binary response to maximize validity
of the overall test while accounting for random guessing [12]. An
alert with p = 1.0 indicates that the correct classification may be
obvious to the participants, whereas an alert with a p ≪ 0.85 may
indicate that the alert data is insufficient or misleading.
An item’s discrimination index, D, measures the difference in
responses to the item between high- and low-performers on the
overall task. Each participant’s number of correctly classified alerts
is counted. Two groups are formed from the 27% of participants
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Table 3: Item Difficulty and Discrimination Index Statistics
per False Alarm Rate (FAR) Treatment
50% FAR 86% FAR
p D p D
mean 0.75 0.30 0.76 0.41
std 0.22 0.30 0.20 0.35
min 0.29 -0.29 0.16 -0.29
Q1 0.60 0.00 0.62 0.14
Q2 (median) 0.76 0.29 0.77 0.43
Q3 0.95 0.57 0.92 0.71
max 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00
participants 25 26
true alarms 25 6
false alarms 25 44
with the highest and lowest scores to minimize chance error [11].
To calculate an alert’s D, subtract the number correct in the low
group from the number correct in high group, then divide the dif-
ference by the size of the larger group. Values of D are in the
range [−1.0, 1.0]. Ebel states that items where D > 0.40 are use-
ful discriminators, 0.20 ≤ D ≤ 0.40 are in need of improvement,
and D < 0.20 are poor discriminators and should be eliminated or
rewritten [8].
4.2 Analysis
Table 3 shows the item difficulty and discrimination index statis-
tics calculated per treatment group. Item difficulty (p) scores are
similar across groups, which suggests the dataset is reliable across
treatments. The mean and median discrimination index scores (D)
are in the range warranting improvement per Ebel [8]. The nega-
tive minD value shows that at least one alert is misleading because
low performers answered it correctly more than high performers.
Table 4 bins the alerts according to their p and D scores. Ap-
proximately 40% of the alerts evaluated by each group have a good
discrimination index per Ebel [8]. Approximately 30% of the alerts
fall into the "too easy" category where many of the participants
correctly classified the alert. In the Cry Wolf experiment, unlike
in educational tests, such alerts are useful because they help build
and reinforce the participants’ notions of true and false alarms.
The alarms that are "too hard" are cause for concern as they
may indicate that the Cry Wolf training exercises are insufficient
or the alerts are unclear. Two eurotrip alerts have travel times that
are nearly impossible but are false alarms – likely the participants
Table 4: AggregateMeasures of ItemAnalysis. Values are the
Number of Alerts.
50% FAR 86% FAR
D > 0.4 (best) 24 27
p ≥ Q3 and D ≤ 0.4 (too easy) 13 17
p < Q2 and D ≤ 0.4 (too hard) 7 2
were erring on the side of caution. Four alerts from themobile sce-
nario fell into the "too hard" category for the 50% FAR group. One
possible explanation is that the participants did not read or remem-
ber the line near the end of the Security Playbook stating that mo-
bile devices abroad often ping their home city first. The other alerts
in the "too hard" group exhibit no obvious pattern. The D score is
sensitive to random noise given the small sizes of the high and low
groups (n = 7 in each group) for each treatment.
Overall, the difficulty and discrimination indices suggest that
the impossible travel dataset is useful to discriminate between high-
and low- performers. Further qualitative investigation on why the
"too hard" alerts were mis-classified is warranted.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper presents a dataset of simulated IDS alarms, introduces
the Cry Wolf platform for controlled experiments of cyber analyst
performance, and provides an initial evaluation of the dataset’s
quality. The impossible travel dataset and Cry Wolf platform are
open source, and the evaluation shows promising results for dis-
criminating between high and low performers.
In future work, the impossible travel dataset will be expanded
to include new alarm types. The Cry Wolf platformwill be used in
Summer 2020 to study the effects of anchoring bias [14] on cyber
analyst performance. These studies are part of a research plan to
investigate factors impacting cyber analyst performance. The long
term goals of this research are to develop new training method-
ologies for coping with imperfect cyber defense systems, provide
guidance for tool developers on user interface considerations, and
develop defense strategies against analyst-machine vulnerabilities.
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